

Mem. Alex. Young

(2) January 29. 1766.

Johnston

Anstruther-Easter

12. Feb. 1766.

M E M O R I A L

F O R

Alexander Young, George Darsie, Thomas Smith, and Robert Bridges, Counsellors of the Borough of Anstruther-Easter, and for Thomas Scot, and others, Complainers;

Sustain the Objection

A G A I N S T



Andrew Johnston of Renniehill, Charles Robb Tailor in Anstruther-Easter, and others, pretended Magistrates and Counsellors of the said Borough, Respondents.

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THE complainers did, in due time, exhibit their complaint to your Lordships, founded on the statutes of the 2d and 16th of his late Majesty King George II. *for the more effectual preventing bribery and corruption in the election of members to serve in parliament*; setting forth, That at the late Michaelmas election of magistrates and counsellors of the said borough of Anstruther-Easter, the majority of the persons elected had been chosen through the means of bribery and corruption; and more particularly, in consequence, and under the influence of a most corrupt bargain, made with Sir John Anstruther, or his agents, whereby Sir John engaged to pay the public debts of the borough, amounting to about £ 800 Sterling, providing the council should, at the said Michaelmas election,

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tion, be so modelled, as to support the interest of Sir John, in the subsequent choice of their delegate for the election of a member of parliament.

As by a clause in the aforesaid statute of the 16th of the late King, regulating the form of procedure upon such summary complaints, your Lordships are, in general, directed to grant a warrant for summoning the magistrates and counsellors elected by the majority, so the complaint, in this case, prayed your Lordships to grant warrant for serving the same upon the persons, who, the complainers were informed and believed, were the whole magistrates and counsellors elected at Michaelmas last, (excepting the complainers themselves); and "to ordain the said persons to give in their answers; and, upon advising the case, to reduce and make void the pretended election of magistrates and counsellors of the said borough, made on the 14th day of September last."

Your Lordships having accordingly granted warrant for service, in common form, the complaint was regularly served upon all and each of the present magistrates and counsellors, other than the complainers. Answers were thereupon given in, containing, *inter alia*, a preliminary objection, importing, That among the persons complained upon, mention was made of one *Thomas Brown wright*, as a present counsellor of the borough, whereas there is no counsellor of that name, but there is one named *George Brown*, upon whom the messenger had, without authority, served the complaint, and consequently the said George Brown, not being a complainer, nor properly called as a defender, the whole council were not made parties, and the complaint fell to be dismissed. Replies were given in to these answers, and, upon advising the cause, your Lordships were pleased to appoint parties to give in memorials upon that objection. This, accordingly, is humbly offered upon the part of the complainers.

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As the complainers were desirous of throwing all the light upon this question that they could possibly do; so, since the above appointment of memorials, they have employed a proper person to search the records of the proceedings in election-causes, and others, since the act of the 16th of the late King, in order to discover precedents or decisions upon similar questions: But though great pains has been bestowed in this search, they have not yet discovered any thing to the purpose; and they are told, that it would take many weeks more to finish the search. The complainers, therefore, can only propose at present, to make some addition to what has been formerly argued for them, and mention such authorities as they have met with.

The nature of the objection has been already explained; and the short state of the fact, which gave rise to it, is this: The complainers having heard, that, among the counsellors elected, there was one named *Thomas Brown*, a *wright*, they, in their complaint, craved a warrant for service upon him, as well as the other counsellors; but before the complaint was actually served, the complainers got certain information, that *Brown* the *wright* and *counsellor's* Christian name was not *Thomas*, but *George*: They therefore directed the messenger to make the service upon *George Brown*, the person truly intended; and both the copy of citation delivered to him *personally*, and the execution of the messenger bear, that he had been erroneously named *Thomas* in the complaint.

Such is the fact; and in answer to the objection itself thereupon founded, the complainers must, in the *first* place, submit to your Lordships, That the complaint was exhibited under such circumstances as sufficiently excuse the complainers, and bar the respondents from availing themselves of such a trivial mistake as this seems to be. As the election in question had been brought about by the most
unjustifiable

unjustifiable means, so, after it was over, the conduct of the respondents, and their adherents, was, in many respects, equally improper. Among other devices for maintaining the advantage they had gained, they seemed to have thought it material, to keep the complainers as much, and as long in the dark, with regard to their proceedings at the election, as possible. With this, or some other view, the council-book, containing the minutes of election, which used to lie in the custody of the town-clerk, the writer and proper custodier of that record, was taken from him, and put into the hands of the treasurer. By this, or other means, the complainers could not get access to that book, or an extract from it, till long after the complaint was presented; although they frequently demanded the same from the town-clerk. It appears, from the complaint itself, page 6. that, at the time of its being drawn, the complainers had not got an extract of the minutes, and therefore, could not give a full state of the proceedings. In fact, they did not get the extract sooner than the beginning of this month of January; after requiring, under form of instrument, the respondents, when convened as magistrates and counsellors, to furnish the same. This requisition cannot be denied, although, in respect of its having been complied with, it was thought unnecessary for Alexander Clapperton, the notary, to extend the protest.

The case so standing, it can be no matter of surprize, far less of blame, upon the complainers, that they should have fallen into this innocent mistake as to the Christian name of Mr *Brown*. They were rightly informed that one *Brown*, a wright, had been elected a counsellor, but by some error, probably in the writer of the list, he was called *Thomas*, in place of *George*. Had the minutes of council been got, and transmitted to the complainers agent at Edinburgh, this mistake would have been observed, and corrected in time. But the minutes could not be transmitted,

mitted, nor had the complainers occasion to see the complaint till it was given in, and transmitted to be served, when the mistake was discovered, and every thing done, in the complainers power, to correct it, by the service and execution already mentioned.

The complainers, with great deference, apprehend, That, under these circumstances, the respondents cannot be intitled to avail themselves of this objection, to the effect of getting the complaint dismissed. The complainers must leave it with your Lordships to consider, in due time, what might be the consequence of such dismissal. Should the objection be regarded only as a dilator, there can be no inducement for giving way to it, since the respondents cannot thereby reap any substantial benefit, but only occasion unnecessary trouble and expence to the complainers. On the other hand, if it should be considered as resolving into a peremptory defence, so as to foreclose the complainers from any other means of redress, the strongest motives of equity and justice would concur for repelling it, as it would be an extreme hardship, were the complainers to be deprived of their just right, and an election to be established, which, in *hoc statu*, must be held to have been brought about by the most corrupt and illegal means, merely in respect of this mistake of part of a counsellor's name, to which the respondents themselves have contributed, and when the man has, nevertheless, been truly cited as a party.

2do, As to the merits of the objection itself, the complainers apprehend, that it is not relevant, because, from the description given in the complaint, *satis constat de persona*. There is not the least room to doubt, that the person intended to be complained upon, is this George Brown *wright*, and *counsellor* of the borough. There is not another person of the name of *Brown*, a member of this council: There is not even another counsellor who follows the business of a *wright*. It is impossible, therefore, that any doubt can remain who was the person complained upon, when he was pointed

out by so many distinguishing circumstances, as his surname *Brown*, his business of a *wright*, and his office as a *counsellor*. Had his Christian name been left blank, it must be acknowledged, that there could not have been the least shadow of an objection. Why then should an objection arise from his Christian name being erroneously filled up, while, at the same time, no uncertainty whatever flows from that error, but, on the contrary, the person meant is pointed out with as much certainty as if his Christian name had been properly inserted?

The only use of proper names is to distinguish persons. Hence, where a person is sufficiently ascertained by a designation, to name him becomes unnecessary. Had both name and surname been here omitted, the person meant was sufficiently pointed out, and there could have been no doubt on whom the complaint was to be served. Nay, had both been erroneously filled up, still that error could never have misled the messenger, in serving the complaint, when it cannot be even alledged that there is another *counsellor*, who is by employment a *wright*, besides this George Brown. The concern, too, which *Brown* has in this cause is merely *ex officio* as a *counsellor*, and not as a private person; consequently his being properly distinguished by his public character, joined with his surname and occupation, is all that in reason is necessary. When such is the case, it must appear somewhat extraordinary, should the insertion of the word *Thomas*, in mentioning the man's name, instead of *George*, have the effect of screening all the corrupt practices of the respondents, in so far as to cast this complaint; and still more so, should it eventually render valid an election of magistrates and counsellors, otherwise void and null.

The effect of a *misnomer* in judicial proceedings, has not been particularly treated of by our lawyers, probably owing to its having been little regarded, especially in matters of civil right, *si constet de persona*. This seems to be the sole object of our laws and statutes, that the party shall be sufficiently

sufficiently designed or described, so as to distinguish him from others.

The subject has been more nicely considered in the law of England. We there find these rules laid down as to *misnomers*: "*Nomen est quasi rei notamen*, and was invented to make a distinction between person and person; and where a person is described, so as that he may be certainly distinguished and known from other persons, the omission, or, in some cases, the mistake of the name shall not avoid the grant." II. "*Rep.* 20, 21. And if the name of a party is mistaken, the judges ought to mould a small mistake therein, to make good a contract, &c. and so as to support the act of the party by the law;" *Hob.* 125. Hence lands given to Robert Earl of Pembroke, whose name was Henry, and to George bishop of Norwich, whose name was John, were held good grants; *Coke*, 1st *Inst.* f. 3.

Jacob's Law.
Dict. voce
Misnomer.

In cases of a criminal nature, more precision may be justly required, in order to give the party accused every advantage; yet we find that, in the case of felony, where a party is indicted and brought to the bar, a *misnomer* of the Christian name will not cast *the indictment* (though it will an appeal), if it appear that the party is sufficiently known by the description given of him. Thus Lord Chief Justice *Hale* observes, "That if the defendant, in an appeal or indictment, plead *misnomer* of his surname, the plaintiff or King may aver, *Que connus per un nosme & l'autre*, 1 H. 7. 29. a.—But in an appeal or action at the suit of the party, if *misnomer* be pleaded of the Christian name, the plaintiff must take issue, and cannot plead *connus per l'un nosme & l'autre*, 1 H. 7. 29. a. &c. In an indictment of felony, if the prisoner plead *misnomer* of his Christian name, some books hold it a good plea, 11 H. 4. 41. b. *misnomer* 18th, &c; but other books of greater and later authority be to the contrary, &c. 1 H. 5. 5. b. *misnomer* 9. coron. 274, &c.—It seems by the case of Gerard, before cited, which was a record of a plea in the

Pleas of the
Crown, part
2. cap. 50.
p. 238.

“ the time of Edw. IV. though the defendant may plead
 “ *misnomer* of his Christian name, yet the King may aver
 “ *connus per l'un nosme & l'autre*, though it be otherwise in
 “ an appeal.”

As to the case of General Gordon of Auchintoul, which has been mentioned as a precedent for the respondents, the objection was made, to avoid a forfeiture for high-treason, where every exception must be favourably received. The description given of the General in the act of attainder, was, “ Major-General *Thomas Gordon*, Laird of Auchintoul;” whereas his Christian name was *Alexander*. When the cause came before the House of Lords, upon appeal, the question was put to the judges, “ Whether if Major-General *Alexander Gordon*, Laird of Auchintoul, had been brought to the King’s-bench bar, and execution prayed against him, the Court would have awarded execution?” The judges answered in the negative; “ because, in awarding execution, they must pursue the act of parliament on which the judgment is founded;” and thereupon the decree of this Court, finding the General not attainted, was affirmed. This appears from the learned Judge *Foster’s* reports, page 81. and, in the complainers humble apprehension, cannot apply to the present case, which evidently does not require the same precision as to names, as either indictments for crimes, or acts of attainder for high-treason, the purpose of mentioning the counsellors in this complaint, as well as the tendency of the action, being quite of a different nature.

A different decision, also very lately, occurred, even in a matter of treason, which your Lordships will remember. It is the case of *Lord Pitligo*, who was mentioned in the act of attainder, by the description of “ *Alexander Lord Pitligo*.” He claimed the estate as not forfeited, in respect, that, by the patent of his family, the peerage was conferred by the title of “ *Lord Forbes of Pitligo*.” Your Lordships *sustained* the claim; but, upon an appeal, the decree

cree was *reversed*. It appears from the report of the case, that although the counsel for the crown admitted, that a title of dignity is *parcel of the name*, yet they maintained, that there was no necessity for the legislature's being confined to any precise forms of expression in an act of attainder, if their meaning appeared with sufficient certainty.

The complainers, however, will say no more on such cases, as, at any rate, they humbly think they can form no rule for the present, where nothing more is the subject of inquiry, than, Whether this George Brown, is, or is not to be held as a party in Court, where he has certainly been cited to compear, and is appearing by his counsel, and where no penalty is sought to be recovered from him, far less a forfeiture of his life or estate.

This leads the complainers to the *third* and *last* branch of their argument; namely, That, notwithstanding the error as to Brown's Christian name, which casually slipped into the complaint, yet, in fact, he has properly been made a party to this process, by service of the complaint upon him. The complainers have already shown, and indeed there can be no room to doubt, that this George Brown was the person intended to be complained of, and to be served and sifted as a party accordingly; seeing it is undeniable, that there is no other person than he who is of the surname of *Brown*, of the business of a *wright*, and a *counsellor* of Anstruther-Easter; accordingly the messenger did duly serve the said George Brown with this complaint, and his Christian name, as well as all the other parts of his designation, is properly entered both in the copy of citation given to him, and in the execution returned by the messenger. Neither, with submission, is the objection well-founded, that this service and execution was done without a proper warrant.

The complainers apprehend, that there is no necessity for all the formality that is commonly used in complaints

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like the present, by praying for a warrant, specially to cite such and such persons as magistrates and counsellors. The statute of the 16th of the late King, on which all complaints of this nature must necessarily be founded, requires no such precision. It only requires, that the Court shall grant a warrant for summoning "The magistrates and counsellors elected by the majority, on thirty days notice." A warrant prayed for, and granted in terms of the statute, is certainly all that is necessary on such a complaint; and indeed it may often happen, that the party injured cannot discover the real names and designations of every person elected by the majority, before the complaint must be put in; consequently a general warrant for citing the magistrates and counsellors elected by the majority, would be available for answering all the purposes of the statute. Now such a warrant has here been in effect craved and granted, the prayer of the complaint being for authority to serve on the pretended magistrates and counsellors for the present year: And although the complainers did also mention the names of these magistrates and counsellors, and thereby fell into this mistake as to *Brown*, yet the principle of law, *Utile per inutile non vitiatur*, here applies. The warrant was therefore sufficient authority, for citing all the pretended counsellors, elected by the majority, (who were not complainers), under their proper names and designations; and the messenger accordingly did rightly cite this *George Brown*, to the effect of making him a party to this cause.

The complainers shall conclude, with submitting it to your Lordships consideration, Whether, supposing the objection were admitted and sustained, so as to have *Brown* held as yet not properly cited, the consequence thereof should be the dismissing this complaint. The statute of the 16th of the late King, does not require as essential, that the names of the counsellors, elected by the majority, should

should be mentioned in the complaint. It is sufficient, that the complaint set forth the wrong done at the election, and crave to have the same rectified. The complaint must be presented to your Lordships, within two calendar months after the election; but the statute does not require, nor has it in practice been held necessary, that it should be also served within that time. The complaint, therefore, is but a general libel, as to the wrong done at the election; and as your Lordships, in other cases, do allow libels to be amended, so it is apprehended, that your Lordships might still allow the complainers to correct the error in the complaint, as to *Brown's* name, and to serve it of new upon him, seeing it was presented to your Lordships in due time, and would have been relevant, tho' *Brown's* name had not been at all mentioned in it.

In respect whereof, &c.

DAV. RAE.

